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标题: China since 1978 2nd edition (更新至19楼Chapter3) [打印本页]

作者: 指纹 时间: 12-7-2010 22:02
标题: China since 1978 2nd edition (更新至19楼Chapter3)
声明：本帖所载内容仅限于英语学习交流，转载之著作-China since 1978-内容版权属于原作者。严禁转载。所载之原著观点不代表本人立场。
最近在读一本书：
Title: China since 1978 - Reform, Modernisation and "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics"
Author: Colin Mackerras - is Head of the School of Modern Asian Studies, within the faculty of International Business and Politics at Griffith University, Queensland, Australia
想把原文慢慢敲上来跟大家分享，又恐怕有谈论政治的嫌疑。但是这是我第一次看外国人写中国，也是第一次见到大量的政治术语的英文表达，个人认为作为学习材料还是挺有意思的。
所以想问问斑竹和朋友们的意见，到底能不能发。

Contents
1 Introduction
2 Historical Background
3 Political History I: Two Third Plenums and the Interim, 1978-84
4 Political History II: The Worsening of Reform Problems, 1984-89
5 Political History III: Crisis to Recovery, 1989-92
6 Political History IV: The Strengthening of Reform, 1992-97
7 Agriculture and Rural Industry
8 Industrial Economic Reform
9 Foreign Trade and Investment
10 Ideology and Socialism
11 Political Institutional Reform
12 Party-state and Society
13 The Law
14 The Environment
15 Education
16 Health Delivery and Social Welfare
17 Population
18 Foreign Relations I: The superpowers and Soviet Successor States
19 Foreign Relations II: The Neighbors
20 Conclusion

[ 本帖最后由指纹于 20-7-2010 22:20 编辑 ]

作者: half 时间: 12-7-2010 22:15
愿意看，
俺不是版主。

作者: jerryzh 时间: 12-7-2010 23:13
用英文没关系，GFW不对英文敏感。很多敏感博客都用英文写：）

BTW,可以看看《China: Fragile Superpower》，当时看完很无奈。
作者简介：
Susan Shirk is a professor in the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego, and research director of the University of California's system-wide Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC), which is based at UCSD.

Shirk served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997-2000. She was the IGCC’s director from 1991-97, during which time she founded the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue, a track-two security forum. Shirk has served on the Defense Policy Board, which advises the U.S. Secretary of Defense on international security issues, and on the boards of the East-West Center in Hawaii and the U.S.-Japan Foundation.

She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[ 本帖最后由 jerryzh 于 12-7-2010 22:18 编辑 ]

作者: 指纹 时间: 13-7-2010 11:06
犹豫ing
很容易引起政治讨论呀.....

作者: lilac227 时间: 13-7-2010 13:09
想看看，想知道外国人眼里的中国

作者: pinxinge 时间: 13-7-2010 13:20
提示: 作者被禁止或删除, 无法发言 太敏感的部分可以删去哦。

作者: LittleWang 时间: 13-7-2010 13:48
Hi, I think you can scan this book page by page then convert it to be in Word version using the Acrobat professional 8.1.
At last you can copy and paste that here if you want.

作者: nizi 时间: 13-7-2010 14:00
给个链接吧，最好发出来，注明转载和英语学习。谢谢

作者: 指纹 时间: 13-7-2010 15:54

原帖由 LittleWang 于 13-7-2010 12:48 发表

 登录/注册后可看大图

Hi, I think you can scan this book page by page then convert it to be in Word version using the Acrobat professional 8.1.
At last you can copy and paste that here if you want.

Hi good idea.
I'm starting scanning it tonight and might get an OCR software to transfer the images to word doc.
Glad to see quite a few positive responses.

作者: 指纹 时间: 13-7-2010 15:55

原帖由 nizi 于 13-7-2010 13:00 发表

 登录/注册后可看大图

给个链接吧，最好发出来，注明转载和英语学习。谢谢

I didn't find any free resource on the Internet, but will keep looking and post it once I get one.

作者: nizi 时间: 13-7-2010 16:07
标题: 回复 #10 指纹的帖子
贴出来呀，英文别人基本不仔细看的

作者: 指纹 时间: 13-7-2010 22:15
标题: Introduction
有没有强人给做翻译的？
Chapter 1 Introduction
The aim of this book is to provide an accessible account of the history of China from 1978 to 1997, focusing on the themes of reform and modernization.
Late in 1978 a series of intense debates took place within the Chinese leadership, culminating in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in December. Two closely related results of these debates and of the Third Plenum stand out as important. One was the establishment of reform policies, directed towards the modernization of China’s economy and society, as the supreme official line of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The other was consolidation of the power of Deng Xiaoping, who had long advocated such reform policies. Deng's brand of reformed Marxism-Leninism, with modernization as its core, is called 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'.
For Deng Xiaoping, modernization meant more industrialization, greater use of more advanced technology, more rapid economic development and a higher standard of living for as many people as possible. It also meant a transformation of the people's attitudes, leading them to want to move away from the stereotypes of the Cultural Revolution period and from the bonds of the traditional feudal past, and towards a society more open to the outside world. One part of Deng's ‘Modern’ China was a formal legal system before which everyone would be equal. Modernization meant democracy in the sense that people would be freer to learn new ways and ideas, and would gain new means to participate in politics to replace the 'mass line' of the Maoist era, but it certainly did not mean the Western style in which rival parties would compete for political power. At no time did Deng envisage formal abandonment of Marxism-Leninism as the ideological basis of China, nor that a more modern society guided by ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ should threaten the CCP.
The context of reform was a China which had been through the rule of Mao Zedong. A titan of twentieth-century politics, Mao had unified China, brought the CCP to power, and carried out much-needed radical reforms in the economy and society. However, as he grew older, he became more radical, more unrealistic in his revolutionary ideals, more tyrannical in imposing his ideas on his people and more paranoid in destroying anyone he perceived to be an opponent. The Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76) saw him throw the country into chaos in pursuit of his revolutionary goals. Reaction against the instability and constant political campaigns was undoubtedly a major reason why the Chinese people adopted Deng Xiaoping's reforms so readily.
This book is designed as a textbook, primarily for university or college students. Since the coverage is quite broad, the authors hope that journalists, business people or general readers wishing to gain an understanding of contemporary China will find it interesting and suitable for their purposes.
The framework of the book is multidisciplinary, combining the disciplines of history, political economy and political science to describe, analyse and interpret the development of the human condition in contemporary China. The book is descriptive in that it seeks to convey the kind of accurate information which the authors think necessary for a good basic understanding of Chinese history from the late 1970s to the late 1990s. It is analytical and interpretative in its division and arrangement of material, in the use of information, and in the significance which the authors attach to particular events and facts. The selection of themes is dictated by the needs of the university and college students for whom the book is mainly designed, and by the scales of importance adopted by the three authors.
There is no special message in this book. Al1 three authors recognise both the immense problems which the Chinese leaders have faced in the era of reform and their achievements-their successes and failures, their good and bad actions. All authors were and remain appalled at the Beijing massacre of June 1989 and see it as a very black mark on the period of reform. On the other hand, none sees it as a reason for negating everything China has accomplished since 1978.
A1l authors know the Chinese language and have lived in and travelled widely in China during the period with which this book is concerned. Clearly each has relied to some extent on personal experiences and on the information and insights gathered in China. Al1 follow the Chinese media and read works in Chinese on their topics of special interest. The extensive and excellent research which has been carried out in the West since the late 1970s has also proved an invaluable reservoir of information. The analytical bibliography at the end of the book draws attention to some of the best works relevant to the topics covered, giving the reader guidance on where to look further for insights and information.
This is a genuinely joint work in the sense that each author has studied and critiqued what the others have written, with a view to securing coherence and integration. However, one or other of the authors has undertaken the basic writing of each chapter. Colin Mackerras has written 1-5, 13, and 15-18: Pradeep Taneja Chapters 7-9, 14 and 19; and Graham Young Chapters 10-12. Chapters 6 and 20 are jointly written by Colin Mackerras and Graham Young. In addition, Graham Young has carried out some detailed and extensive editing, as well as judicious cutting, of the whole typescript.
The structure of the book is essentially the same as in the first edition. However, the changes are in fact somewhat more extensive than merely updating the material. A few corrections have been made and comments made by reviewers of the first edition taken into account. Most important of all, the economic chapters have been almost completely rewritten. They deal with different topics which the three authors considered to be more appropriate to the late 1990s than the original chapters. The three chapters on political structure and ideology have also been extensively updated, revised and expanded.
We acknowledge gratefully comments and criticisms from others, in particular Professors David Goodman of the University of Technology, Sydney, and Peter Lisowski of the University of Tasmania. However, each author remains responsible for the points of view expressed in his own chapters, as well as for any mistakes which might have survived the extensive checking and criticism to which the text has been subjected.

作者: nizi 时间: 14-7-2010 14:17
标题: 回复 #12 指纹的帖子
还是你这个强人给直接翻译吧，大意即可，谢谢

作者: Richard.G 时间: 14-7-2010 14:52
The decription says "This textbook by this writer on Asia provides an account of the history of China from 1978 through to 1997, focusing on the themes of reform and modernisation." But I still cannot find it in City Library.....

作者: 指纹 时间: 14-7-2010 15:31
I couldn't find any free resource on Internet. The following link shows possible libraries which might have this book available.
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/750 ... p;rtop45757670=true

作者: 指纹 时间: 14-7-2010 22:45

原帖由 nizi 于 14-7-2010 13:17 发表

 登录/注册后可看大图

还是你这个强人给直接翻译吧，大意即可，谢谢

没时间呀

！扫描原书容易，OCR太烂，校对没时间。第一章还没对完。
有时间一定试译一下

作者: 指纹 时间: 16-7-2010 21:20
标题: 试译第一章简言
简言
本书侧重于中国从1978年至1997年的改革和现代化进程，希望给予读者对这段历史的一个基本了解。
1978年末，中国领导层发生了相当激烈的争论，在12月份的第十一届中央委员会第三次全体会议（十一届三中全会）达到顶峰。两个关系密切的结论在三中全会得以强调：一个是确立改革开放政策，将实现中国经济社会的现代化作为中国共产党和中华人民共和国的基本路线。第二则是巩固了长期主张改革开放政策的邓小平的地位。邓的以现代化为核心的马列主义思想，称之为“有中国特色的社会主义”。
对邓小平来说，现代化意味着更高的工业化程度，更充分的利用现代科学技术，更快的经济发展速度和给予尽可能多的人更高水平的生活标准。而且也意味着改变人们的思想意识，把人们从文化大革命和旧封建传统的桎梏中解放出来，以通往一个开放于外部世界的社会。邓小平的现代化中国的含义之一是一个正规的法律体系，在此面前人人平等。现代化之民主意味着群众有学习新思想和新方法的自由，以新的方式参政议政，从而区别于毛泽东时代的群众路线。当然这完全不同于西方体制中的多党派竞争政治权利的方式。邓小平从未摒弃马列主义作为中国意识形态的基础，也不认为以有中国特色的社会主义为指导的现代化社会应当危及中国共产党的领导。
改革之前的中国是完全由毛泽东的政策指导的。作为二十世纪政坛的伟人，毛统一了中国，确立了中共的领导地位，并且进行了一系列非常必要的且激进的经济和社会改革。可是随着他进入老年，他的改革理想变得越来越偏激和不切实际，他越来越顽固地给他的人民灌输他的思想，而且越来越偏执地打击他所认为的他的敌人。文化大革命的十年见证了他为了追求他的革命目标而将整个国家陷于混乱。对社会混乱和持续政治斗争的反感揭示了为什么人民群众很容易就接受了邓小平的改革政策。
本书是作为大专院校的教科书所写。内容涵盖广泛，作者希望新闻工作者，公务人员乃至普通读者都能够从自己的兴趣和目的出发，对于理解当代中国有所收获。
（后面的略了，都是些没用的话。）

作者: 指纹 时间: 17-7-2010 12:32
Chapter 2 Historical Background
Two men, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, have dominated China's politics since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power on 1 October 1949 and established the People's Republic of China (PRC). Mao Zedong was Chairman of the CCP from March 1943 until his death in September 1976. He was also President of the PRC from 1949 until 1959. Beyond his formal positions, Mao was an almost unchallengeable political force, as the leader and main strategist of the CCP'S 1949 victory, the author of its guiding ideology 'Mao Zedong Thought', and the 'Great Helmsman of China’s socialist revolution.
Deng Xiaoping occupied major CCP and state positions from 1949 to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, particularly as General Secretary of the CCP from 1956. At that time, Deng was subordinate to Mao, and his career suffered interruptions through defeat in power struggles. By far the most serious hiatus was during the Cultural s Revolution, when for several years he was publicly humiliated and excoriated as 'the Number 2 Party person in authority taking the capitalist road'. But Deng was to have a far longer career in PRC politics than Mao, since he outlived him by more than twenty years, not dying until since February 1997. His period of greatest power was from the end of 1978 until the early 1990s-that is, during most of the period of this book's focus.
Among other political figures who have played prominent roles in the PRC, the most significant were Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi. Zhou was Premier of the PRC government from its establishment until his death on 8 January 1976. He was also Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1949 to 1958 and dominated china's foreign relations until his death. Liu occupied senior CCP and state posts during 1949-66, including replacing Mao Zedong as the President of the PRC in 1959. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong had him humiliated as 'the Number 1 Party person in authority taking the capitalist road'. Less fortunate than Deng Xiaoping he died in prison in 1969 after having been expelled from the Party and dismissed from all posts the year before.
While these men all claimed to be dedicated Marxist-Leninists, they were often associated with different types of policies. During Mao's era there was tension between the desire for economic growth and egalitarian revolution. Mao was the architect of the ultra-radical Cultural Revolution, with its passionate anti-bureaucratism. After Mao, these concerns were displaced, as under Deng Xiaoping the CCP's focus shifted to 'modernisation' and 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', departing dramatically from Mao's emphases and priorities.
The early PRC, 1949-66
The early to mid-1950s were a period of consolidation of CCP rule. Given the appalling state of the economy and the disintegration of society in the late 1940s, following a century of turbulence, civil war and foreign occupation, the early period of CCP rule was a reasonably creditable one.
The economy recovered and the people were generally enthusiastic about their new rulers. The new regime succeeded in reuniting the country under a single government more effectively than any other since the late years of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911).
Certainly there were problems. While China was strongly supported by the Soviet Union, it faced implacable opposition from abroad, especially from the United States. Internal resistance persisted for some years. Many of the CCP's main reforms, especially land reform, became very violent affairs, and many people were killed in the process of revolution. But the CCP succeeded in effecting a major transfer of power which destroyed the richest classes, the landlords and comprador bourgeoisie, redistributed land and much other property to the poorer classes, and carried out much-needed reforms such as eliminating the worst excesses of oppression of women and the minority nationalities. The CCP's political and economic order clearly worked reasonably well and brought major political, economic and social benefits to the Chinese people.
Mao Zedong was a revolutionary who wanted much more than a stable economy and society for China. At least from the late 1950s he appeared bent on changing the nature of the Chinese people altogether, to make them more co-operative and communitarian, rather than being concerned about individualistic or family interests. In 1958 he engineered two major related social experiments: the Great Leap Forward and the people's communes. Both relied on the masses to raise production and thrust China forward to a new and supposedly higher level of socialism. In the countryside, the people's communes pushed peasants into large co-operative groups in which land was collectively owned and worked, and the private economy dwindled. The experiments were disastrous failures and resulted not in a leap forward but a severe downturn in the economy, including a famine so catastrophic that China's overall population actually declined in both 1960 and 1961.
The country recovered somewhat during the 1960s, after the Great Leap Forward was discontinued. The people's communes survived, but were changed to allow for greater degree of private life and production. Mao postponed but did not cancel his attempt to take China on to a radical socialist path. The opposition which his Great Leap Forward policies had aroused both within the CCP and society as a whole did not deflect him from his course. No sooner did the economy start to recover than he began measures for a new and larger attempt at radicalization.
In 1962 Mao began to re-emphasize the importance of class struggle in a 'socialist' society. This became his obsession. He became convinced that revolutionary changes could be reversed, and even that 'bourgeois' influences prevailed at senior levels of the CCP, among those he dubbed as 'revisionists'. His fears for China were reinforced by his conviction that the Soviet Union was taking a revisionist road which was destroying the gains of the revolution there. He decided that, although the economic base had undergone revolution in China, it was necessary to carry out yet another revolution-this time transforming the whole of Chinese culture.
Most of the senior leaders feared that a cultural revolution such as Mao envisaged would have devastating effects on China's economy and its social stability. Determined to get his way, Mao appealed to the youth of the country, especially the students, among whom his notions found intense support.
The Cultural Revolution
In August 1966, Mao pushed through the Central Committee a decision in favour of undertaking a cultural revolution, described as 'a great revolution that touches people to their very souls and constitutes a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a stage which is both broader and deeper'. Immediately afterwards, Mao held several gigantic rallies in Tiananmen Square in the centre of the PRC capital, Beijing, at which he gave his blessing to the Red Guards, or young people who were to be responsible for carrying out this revolution.
The main two leaders who were soon to be designated as revisionists opposing Mao's revolution were Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Among his supporters, the most ardent was his wife, Jiang Qing who played a major political role and also carried out a very radical but desperately unpopular revolution in the arts, especially the Peking opera. Mao's chosen deputy was Lin Biao, who had been appointed as Minister of National Defence and thus the leader of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in 1959. According to one major account, Lin was not particularly ambitious, but was rather a tragic figure 'thrust into a leading role by Mao' who saw it as sensible to follow Mao's wishes as far as he could ascertain them. Another apparent supporter of the Cultural Revolution was Zhou Enlai. Unlike Jiang Qing he was keen to prevent the excesses which it involved and was a moderating influence. What he really thought about it remains unclear, but he was quite definitely determined not to quarrel with Mao.
The young Red Guards took Mao's notions extremely seriously and appealed to believe in them passionately. Their attempts to destroy the old culture included public humiliation of any individuals associated with it, the banning of most old-fashioned, traditional or Western art, and the suppression of virtually all forms of religious practice, which involved the closing and ransacking of churches and temples. But the movement was not restricted to such aspects of 'culture'. It rapidly spread to encompass virtually all aspects of Chinese politics, society and economy. The key theme was seizure of power by the masses from all persons in authority perceived as 'taking the capitalist road'. Not surprisingly, those so accused disagreed with the charge, thinking of themselves as honest people who had devoted their lives to the revolution. They resisted pressures from young persons, shouting Maoist slogans, to yield up their power to 'true revolutionaries'. The Maoists themselves split into factions, each claiming to be more revolutionary than the others.
Despite efforts by Zhou Enlai and probably also Lin Biao to prevent it, violence broke out often, with conflicts close to civil war in quite a few locations, including Sichuan and Guangxi. One important instance was in Wuhan, capital of the central Chinese province of Hubei, in July and August 1967. The regional military commander, Chen Zaidao, led a large faction hostile to the Cultural Revolution, which was supported by local Red Guard groups. After an attempt by Zhou Enlai to mediate between them failed, war broke out, lasting nearly three weeks. Although Chen Zaidao was defeated and dismissed, the incident threatened a return to warlordism, which the centre could ill afford to tolerate.
One of the aims of the revolution was to create a new and supposedly more revolutionary and egalitarian mass system of administration. The model selected was the 'revolutionary committee', a tripartite alliance among the masses, the army and the revolutionary cadres. At the provincial level the first of these was set up in Heilongjiang, in China's .
north-east, in January 1967. In September 1968 the last two were established in Tibet and Xinjiang, both autonomous regions of minority nationalities in the far west. Almost all units at all levels of society, whether government or not, were encouraged to establish a revolutionary committee, including communes, factories, educational institutions, commercial enterprises and art troupes.
In October 1968, the Central Committee expelled Liu Shaoqi from the Party and dismissed him from all his posts. He was imprisoned and died in November 1969, although this fate was kept secret at the time. Mao later contrived to have even the post of President of the PRC abolished, arguing that it had been poisoned by one occupant, the revisionist Liu, and was unnecessary in his new revolutionary order. Neither of the two PRC Constitutions influenced by the Cultural Revolution, those of 1975 and 1978, includes provisions for the post of President.
In a formal sense, Mao had been victorious in the Cultural Revolution. He had brought about the downfall of those he believed opposed himself and his policies. But the results revealed that Mao's recipe for revolution was extremely misguided. China paid dearly for Mao's victory. The new political order was extremely fragile and rent by dissension. The education system had closed down universities for several years while people argued about how best to implement a revolution in education. Most areas of economy and society were subjected to severe disruption. To keep the people's revolutionary spirit alive, Mao felt it was necessary to orchestrate a series of ideological campaigns in favour of his line. Most people found them not only a waste of time and tedious in the extreme, but also harmful to production as well as to national unity and stability.
The worst case of continuing political dissension involved Lin Biao. In 1969 the CCP Constitution adopted by the Ninth Party Congress had specified Lin as Mao's 'comrade-in-arms and successor'. Official Chinese sources have claimed that, despite being Mao's successor, Lin turned against the Chairman, conspiring to assassinate him and seize power. After the plan failed, in September 1971 Lin fled towards the Soviet Union on an aircraft which crashed in Mongolia, killing all on board.
There have been several very diverse analyses of this affair, and of the official Chinese explanation. They differ on the facts of the case (such as whether Lin actually died on the plane), on issues involved in any conflict, on the main participants in the conflict, and so on. A recent and definitive analysis concludes that many of the claims concerning conflict between Lin and Mao are mistaken. It suggests that Lin lacked political ambition, let alone seeking to overthrow Mao. Lin's downfall arose as he was 'tragically entrapped by his political system and political culture', as a victim of manoeuvres among the political elite in an environment in which Mao was completely dominant and, indeed, unchallengeable.
Thus the Lin Biao affair underlines the profound political effects of the Cultural Revolution. And the affair itself was to have further effects. After Lin’s demise, Mao launched a campaign against him, linking him with China's sage of ancient times, Confucius. The Campaign to Criticise Lin Biao and Confucius began in 1973 and reached the proportions of a mass movement in the early months of 1974. The Chinese people to whom Lin Biao had so recently been presented as Mao's close comrade-in-arms and successor were now asked to excoriate him as a traitor and would-be assassin. It is hardly surprising that this caused much confusion. But still other ideological and political campaigns followed, wearying the Chinese people and increasing cynicism concerning the Cultural Revolution.
The events of 1976
1976 was a year of rapid and dramatic changes in Chinese politics. It began with the death of Zhou Enlai and an outpouring of grief in his memory. It was widely assumed that his successor as Premier would be Deng Xiaoping, who had returned to prominence in 1973 after his disgrace during the early years of the Cultural Revolution. However, Mao launched another campaign - his last, as it turned out - against Deng. The comparative non-entity Hua Guofeng assumed the role of Acting Premier in February 1976.
On 5 April a massive demonstration of mourning for Zhou Enlai took place in Tiananmen Square in central Beijing. Militia working for the Politburo and with Mao's approval suppressed the demonstrators, arresting and wounding hundreds of them. The radical faction led by Jiang Qing immediately declared this Tiananmen Incident 'a counter-revolutionary political incident'. Hua Guofeng, who acquiesced in this assessment, was appointed as Deputy Chairman of the CCP under Mao and confirmed as Premier on 7 April.
During Mao's last years a series of foreign visiting leaders sought to see the aged revolutionary while they still had the chance. A1l such meetings were ritually photographed and publicised, each one showing Mao weaker and sicker. At last, on 15 June 1976, a government spokesman announced that Mao was now too busy with his work to see foreign visitors - in other words, he was too ill.
On 28 July, nature stepped into the mounting political uncertainty with a gigantic earthquake in the coal city of Tangshan in Hebei province, close enough to Beijing to be felt there. There were many casualties, including deaths running into hundreds of thousands. Hua Guofeng led a delegation to visit the earthquake-stricken city. The radicals tried to make political capital out of the disaster for their campaign against the unfortunate Deng Xiaoping and issued divisive, even idiotic, statements such as the following:
The broad masses of the people in the earthquake-stricken areas were deeply moved by the fact that Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee had sent the delegation to visit them. . .Under the impetus of the struggle to criticise Teng Hsiao-p'ing [Deng Xiaoping] and beat back the Right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts and taking class struggle as the key link, they pledged to work hard and self-reliantly and fight in unity so as to restore production and rebuild their homes as soon as possible. They expressed the determination to fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty to win victory.
Apart from the economic effects of so large an earthquake in a major coal-producing area in a country where energy is based on coal, earthquakes are traditionally taken as signs of dynastic change in China. With Mao clearly near death, no amount of revolutionary sloganeering could persuade the Chinese people that this earthquake was other than a sign of the pending end of an era. Duly, Mao Zedong died on 9 September. There was mourning, of course, although probably less deeply felt than for Zhou Enlai only a few months earlier. There was also some relief that the aged tyrant had gone. But above all there was apprehension over who would take control next.
Hua Guofeng's visit to Tangshan convinced him that the endless campaigns simply could not go on, and that what China needed above all was stability. Jiang Qing was unrepentant. She was ambitious to take over the Party chairmanship to replace Mao. Her relations with Hua Guofeng deteriorated, with open arguments erupting at major CCP meetings.
Hua Guofeng emerged victorious in this power struggle. On 6 October he had four of the leaders of the radical faction - Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen - placed under house arrest, an event known as 'the smashing of the ''Gang of Four”’. He then immediately had himself declared the CCP Chairman in succession to Mao. At a mass rally on 24 October Beijing's First Party Secretary, Wu De, announced that in April Mao had designated Hua Guofeng as his successor by writing the six characters ni ban shi, wo fang xin, 'with you in charge, I'm at ease’. The same rally saw the launching of a large-scale campaign against the 'Gang of Four'.
In a major speech on 25 December, Hua Guofeng referred to a 'grand plan' he claimed Mao Zedong had 'mapped out' and Zhou Enlai had reiterated in January 1975. Its aim was to strengthen China's economy and specifically 'to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology and bring our national economy to the front ranks in the world before the end of the century’ - soon to be summarised as the 'four modernisations'.
The successor interregnum
Hua Guofeng had achieved the nation's highest positions. Nevertheless, he faced the daunting task of establishing his own legitimacy and authority in the shadow of the two giants of PRC history, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Hua had gained enormous kudos from his overthrow of the 'Gang of Four', but this was hardly equivalent to proving himself able to govern the country effectively, especially given the very difficult situation in which it found itself.
Hua continued to appeal to Mao's authority. His basic policy was to continue overall support for the policies of the Cultural Revolution and for Chairman Mao, but to denounce the 'Gang of Four' for their wild exaggerations in pushing Mao's ideas too far and hence seriously undermining their effectiveness. The 'Gang of Four' may have looked like leftists, he claimed, but in fact they were counter-revolutionary rightists, and would have brought the country to civil war had they remained in power. Hua promoted the 'four modernisations' to counter the excesses of the 'Gang of Four' in the economic field. In other fields China entered a period which was somewhat less tense and more optimistic, as policies and practices of the Cultural Revolution could be modified while blaming all ills on the catch-all scapegoat the 'Gang of Four'.
In leadership terms, Hua's major problem was what to do about Deng Xiaoping. With the fall of the 'Gang of Four', the anti-Deng campaign began to wither and soon died. Hua might well fear that Deng could become a rival if he returned to the Central leadership. But Deng's influence and stature were so great that Hua could hardly prevent his rehabilitation forever. In July 1977, the Party Central Committee decided to restore Deng to all his posts, including Deputy Chairman of the CCP and Vice-premier of the State Council. It also confirmed Hua Guofeng as CCP Chairman.
The appointments were the prelude to the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP, which convened 12-18 August 1977. Hua's report continued to stress his preoccupation with the evils of the 'Gang of Four', but also reiterated how necessary and desirable he believed the Cultural Revolution to have been. Since class struggle continued to exist and would become very sharp at times, there would obviously need to be many more political revolutions in the future 'in the nature of the Cultural Revolution'. However, Hua also cited Mao's authority to show the need for stability, and for the first time declared that the Cultural Revolution was over: 'the smashing of the ''Gang of Four'' marks the triumphant conclusion of our first Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted eleven years'.
During the year and a half following the Eleventh Congress, the political order which the Cultural Revolution had destroyed revived at an accelerating pace. In 1978 there were meetings of many organizations which had been dormant or which had apparently been destroyed, such as the Chinese National Federation of Literature and Art Circles, the National Women's Congress, the National Congress of Chinese Trade Unions, and the National Congress of the Communist Youth League. In February/March 1978 there was also a meeting of the National People's Congress, which had convened only once during the Cultural Revolution years. The first session of this Fifth National People's Congress confirmed Hua Guofeng as Premier. It also adopted a new PRC Constitution which, while continuing the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, also introduced some significant changes suggesting downgrading of some ideas not only of the 'Gang of Four' but even of Mao. An important example was that revolutionary committees, the administrative organs introduced during the Cultural Revolution, were to remain the organs of government at provincial, county and commune levels, but in units such as factories, educational institutions and cultural organizations they were to be replaced by directors, executives and other such officials. The Cultural Revolution notion of mass participation was thus largely conceded as having failed and as being inappropriate to the new order.
Intellectuals were at the forefront of pushing for a much more rapid retreat from the Cultural Revolution and for a greater emphasis on modernization. Many believed that the persistent vitriolic condemnation of the 'Gang of Four' was inconsistent with the continuing praise heaped on Chairman Mao, who apparently could still do no wrong. On 19 November 1978 a fourteen-page poster appeared on a wall in central Beijing, 'democracy wall', suggesting that Mao was to blame for supporting the 'Gang of Four' and orchestrating the campaign against Deng Xiaoping in 1976.
Such trends reflected increasingly significant divisions within the Central leadership. There were mounting challenges to the Hua regime's appeal to Mao's authority and to its affirmation of the Cultural Revolution even while Cultural Revolution policies were being modified or abandoned. There may have been universal support for the 'four modernisations' constantly emphasized by Hua, but there were disagreements over how they were to be achieved. The impending showdown over China's future came at the famous Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.
Conclusion
The first twenty-nine years of the PRC, from late 1949 to late 1978, changed the country irrevocably. Mao dominated the period and can be accounted one of the great leaders of the twentieth century, but he left a mixed legacy, most of it highly controversial. He had come to be like a god to the Chinese, terrible but wonderful, powerful and fearful but generally beneficial to the people as a whole. It was a truly spectacular event when the poster containing open criticism of the Chairman appeared on the 'democracy wall' at the end of 1978.
The revolution had swept away much of the dross of China's past, and China had made progress towards establishing modern industry. The standard of living of most Chinese was considerably higher in 1978 than it had been in 1949. In most terms China could claim to be more 'modern' in 1978 than it had been in 1949. But the continuities with the past were also substantial, in particular the weakness of the individual before the oppressive power of the state. Some of China's main characteristics were more pronounced than ever, especially its gigantic population and enormous peasantry.
To be sure, China had needed a revolution. But there are costs to revolution. The egalitarian goals which are associated with socialism were beneficial and necessary in a country where hierarchies were traditionally both rigid and oppressive, but Mao more and more used socialism as an ideological justification for economic and social policies which turned out to be harmful for the people. The Cultural Revolution produced gross political instability, dominated by factional fighting at the top. It destroyed the legal system and decreased the CCP's legitimacy.
Might not China have been better off had Mao died in 1966 or earlier? China would be paying the price of the Cultural Revolution for years to come.

作者: 指纹 时间: 20-7-2010 23:19
Chapter 3 Political History I
Two Third Plenums and the Interim 1978-84
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, 18-22 December 1978, introduced the policies of reform under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. The first half-decade from the end of 1978 saw policy changes in the economy in the direction of the market and free enterprise in the countryside. The Cultural Revolution was totally negated and China seemed able to throw out all the Maoist propaganda which had been so deleterious to the Chinese revolution as a whole. The legal system, which had been all but destroyed as a result of the Cultural Revolution, made tentative steps towards revival. Economic and social freedoms of various sorts became permissible. Deng Xiaoping appeared able to solve any leadership struggles in the top echelons of the Party or state with reasonable ease.
The economy boomed and the standard of living rose everywhere, especially in the countryside. There were problems, of course. The revived law system did not prevent the worsening of corruption, and crime began to assume worrying proportions. There were quickly signs that intellectuals were losing enthusiasm for socialism, and some were even turning their backs on it. But in general things appeared to be going well.
The Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee met in October 1984. Its task was to extend the economic reforms in the countryside to the cities by loosening up state controls over prices and management. It thus introduced a new and important stage in reform, but one which turned out to be rather less successful than the first.
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee
The Third Plenum was the climax of a series of major high-level meetings which had taken place behind the scenes as posters calling for changes in direction appeared on the 'democracy wall' in Beijing. It formalized decisions reached in those meetings about the future policy of the CCP and its leadership. One writer has called it 'the fulcrum, which he [Deng] had sought for nearly two decades, with which he could move the Chinese nation dramatically on to a new track in its search for identity’.
Deng Xiaoping had been critical of the slow pace of modernization under Hua Guofeng. He also pushed for a much more radical rejection of the Cultural Revolution than Hua Guofeng was willing to countenance. The Third Plenum showed very clearly that Deng was getting his way. It was the single most important point in his phoenix-like rise to ascendancy. Although Hua Guofeng remained in the position of CCP Chairman and Premier of the State Council, his influence was sharply on the wane from then on, and his disappearance as a major power-holder was only a matter of time.
The main decision of the Third Plenum was to push modernization far more strongly than in the previous years:
Now is an appropriate time to take the decision to close the large-scale nationwide mass movement to expose and criticize Lin Biao and the 'gang of four' and to shift the emphasis of our Party's work and the attention of the people of the whole country to socialist modernization... Socialist modernization is therefore a profound and extensive revolution. There is still in our country today a small handful of counter-revolutionary elements and criminals who hate our socialist modernization and try to undermine it. We must not relax our class struggle against them, nor can we weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat. But as Comrade Mao Tsetung [Zedong] pointed out, the large-scale turbulent class struggles of a mass character have in the main come to an end.
This statement signaled not only the end of the campaign against the 'Gang of Four', but, at least for several years, any other campaigns that seemed remotely similar to the sort of political-ideological movements which had characterized Mao's last years. In particular, the lid was opened on criticism of the Cultural Revolution. The Plenum suggested that the Cultural Revolution should 'be viewed historically, scientifically and in a down-to-earth way' and that its shortcomings and mistakes 'should be summed up at the appropriate time'. In fact, Deng Xiaoping detested the Cultural Revolution - not surprising considering how deeply he had suffered as a result of it - and his intention was to move to discredit it altogether in due course.
Other major policy decisions of the Third Plenum pointed in the same direction of a new deal for China and against the policies of Mao's last years. The Tiananmen Incident of April 1976 was reinterpreted. Whereas the power-holders of the time, mainly Mao and the 'Gang of Four', had castigated it as a 'counter-revolutionary political incident', the Third Plenum described it as the unfolding of a 'great revolutionary mass movement'. Nowhere was the hand of Deng Xiaoping more clearly visible than in this 'reversal of verdicts'. What had followed immediately on the Tiananmen Incident of 1976 was the confirmation of Hua Guofeng as Premier and a major acceleration of the mass campaign of criticism against Deng Xiaoping. In other words, Hua had done very nicely out of the Tiananmen Incident, whereas for Deng had come only humiliation and bitterness. Hua must have been extremely uneasy about the 'Third Plenum's view of the Incident, no matter how strong his public endorsement of it may have been.
Hua was right to worry. He was deposed as Premier at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in September 1980 and as Party Chairman at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, which met 27-29 June 1981. Zhao Ziyang replaced him as Premier, and Hu Yaobang as CCP Chairman. Both were strong supporters of Deng Xiaoping and his reformist policies, and equally strong critics of the Cultural Revolution. In particular, Hu Yaobang had served under Deng Xiaoping as early as the period of the war against Japan. He had been head of the Chinese Youth League in Beijing from 1952 until the League was destroyed, and Hu himself purged, in 1966 at the onset of the Cultural Revolution.
The Third Plenum ushered in extensive changes in more or less all major spheres of life. Apart from the legal system and the economy, these included ideology, education, literature and the arts, the minority nationalities and religion. Some of them are discussed in other chapters of this book.
Although Deng Xiaoping is rightly regarded as the prime leader of the reforms in China, he was at all times absolutely insistent that China should remain socialist. It was he who formulated the terminology, or jargon, around which the debate over the speed and nature of socialist modernization was joined. He summed up the new ideology appropriate to the period of reform in the phrase 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. He first specified the requirement that the Chinese people must oppose 'bourgeois liberalisation' and 'uphold the four cardinal principles' which, he declared in a major speech in March 1979, were 'the basic prerequisite for achieving modernisation':
* We must keep to the socialist road.
* We must uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat.
* We must uphold the leadership of the Communist Party.
* We must uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
Putting the matter in very stark terms, Deng later declared that 'the essence of the four cardinal principles is to uphold Communist Party leadership'. In other words, he perceived the principle of affirming the Leninist notion that the Party must on no account relinquish its monopoly on power, as the most important. On the other hand, 'the keystone of bourgeois liberalization is opposition to Party leadership'. Although Deng had thus laid down the parameters of change at the start of the reform period, it was not until the mid-1980s that upholding the cardinal principles and opposing bourgeois liberalization came to be a major concern of the CCP leadership.
Reform and the negation of the Cultural Revolution
The political history of China in the wake of Third Plenum can be viewed both as a trend in favour of reform and as reaction to the Cultural Revolution. These were two sides of the same coin. Rejection of the Cultural Revolution strengthened through a series of moves which reached a climax at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1981.
An early sign of how reform meant negation of the Cultural Revolution was the complete abolition of the revolutionary committees at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in mid-1979. Early in 1978, these 'new-born things of the Cultural Revolution' had been restricted to organs of government. The Second Session passed laws establishing local people's congresses to replace these remaining revolutionary committees. The senior governmental positions at various levels changed accordingly. So, for instance, the most senior governmental position at province level had been the chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee, but was now the provincial governor.
In February 1980, several further steps were taken by the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in discrediting the Cultural Revolution. Four leaders with known sympathies for the Cultural Revolution and for Hua Guofeng were dismissed, including Wang Dongxing, who had actually managed the arrest of the 'Gang of Four' in October 1976. At the same time, the main target of the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi, was rehabilitated posthumously. The decision of October 1968 to expel Liu Shaoqi from the CCP and to dismiss him from all posts both inside and outside the CCP, which had been taken at Mao's behest, was not only reversed but condemned as the 'biggest frame-up our Party has ever known in its history’. Liu's death in prison in November 1969 was for the first time revealed, and a memorial service was held in his honour. Official pronouncements were careful to blame Lin Biao, the 'Gang of Four' and so on for Liu's death, but his rehabilitation was certainly a major slap in the face for Mao's memory and for the Cultural Revolution.
In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping gave a major speech to the Politburo on his vision of political reform. Naturally he blamed the Cultural Revolution for the fact that China's political system had suffered so severely and become so very undemocratic and 'feudal'. Part of his argument was that Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four' had contrived to persecute so many good cadres that virtually everybody, including the young, had become too cowed to express an opinion or to take any administrative initiative.
Deng advocated a major separation of the roles and powers of the Party and the government. He believed there was too great a concentration of power, with too many senior leaders holding too many posts both in the Party and the government. He called for tighter rules on the retirement of old cadres and a major infusion of young blood into the CCP and government at all levels, affirming his faith in the youth against attacks that they 'may be too inexperienced and not equal to the tasks'. He attacked bureaucracy and patriarchal ways throughout society, denouncing the old way of thinking which had demanded subservience to old age. Deng's stated ideal was that China should 'practise people's democracy to the full...and develop a political situation marked by stability, unity and liveliness’. He was probably quite genuine in this belief. After all, what he had in mind was not Western-style democracy, but a kind which would preserve his 'four cardinal principles', especially Party leadership, and conform to 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. He may not have bargained either for the direction which the process of democratization would take or for the extent to which he would be unable to control it.
In calling for political reforms Deng was speaking from bitter experience and his position gained very widespread support. Attempts were made to implement his ideas over the next few years-some fairly successfully, but others much less so. Certainly, after 1978 freedom in society increased. There was more tolerance of religion. Early in 1979 the PRC'S first national conference on the study of religion was held in Kunming, Yunnan province. Later in the year, Chinese Muslims went on a pilgrimage to Mecca for the first time since 1964. The arts blossomed and became incomparably more varied and interesting. Traditional drama, which had been totally banned during the Cultural Revolution, revived quickly and prolifically.
From 20 November to 29 December 1980, a specially formed court held a trial of sixteen persons involved in the Cultural Revolution. Of these, ten were living, among whom the 'Gang of Four' were the most important, and six dead, including Lin Biao. Some legal implications of the trial are considered in Chapter 13. The trial also had very considerable political significance, especially in the negation of the Cultural Revolution, which was on trial as much as the people accused. The main charge against the living defendants was of framing and persecuting CCP and state leaders as well as large numbers of cadres and ordinary people. For the first time, specific figures of the number of sufferers were issued: according to the indictment, in twelve major cases 729 511 people were framed and persecuted, of whom 34 800 were persecuted to death.
The climax of the moves to discredit the Cultural Revolution was the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. The Plenum issued a long document called ‘On Questions of Party History', which analysed and assessed the history of the CCP from its beginnings until the aftermath of the Third Plenum, including reference to various ideological issues (discussed at greater length in Chapter 10) and to the career and status of Mao Zedong. The Plenum adopted the view that the CCP had done very well until the late 1950s, when things began to go wrong due to 'left' influence. 'The Great Leap Forward was basically a mistake caused by the impatience of Mao and other leaders for quick results. But the main barbs of the document were reserved for the Cultural Revolution itself, which it portrayed as a total disaster without any redeeming features:
The 'cultural revolution', which lasted from May 1966 to October 1976, was responsible for the most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state and the people since the founding of the People's Republic. It was initiated and led by Comrade Mao Zedong. ..The history of the 'cultural revolution' has proved that Comrade Mao Zedong's principal theses for initiating this revolution conformed neither to Marxism-Leninism nor to Chinese reality. They represent an entirely erroneous appraisal of the prevailing class relations and political situation in the Party and state. ..
Practice has shown that the ‘cultural revolution' did not in fact constitute a revolution or social progress in any sense, nor could it possibly have done so. It was we and not the enemy at all who were thrown into disorder by the 'cultural revolution'.
The Sixth Plenum went on to analyse the Third Plenum, claiming that it 'marked a crucial turning point of far-reaching significance in the history' of the CCP since 1949. It alleged that Hua Guofeng had made serious mistakes during his tenure of power, mainly in being far too slow to renounce the Cultural Revolution. That confirmed Deng's final victory in his ideological battle with Hua Guofeng.
The status of Mao Zedong
The main personality involved in the deliberations over the Cultural Revolution was, of course, Mao Zedong. It had been obvious that the immense power wielded by the 'Gang of Four' was due to Mao's backing. Indeed, should not one rather speak of a 'gang of five', with Mao as the most important member? During the trial of 1980, Jiang Qing defended herself against all charges by arguing that everything she had done was on orders from Mao. She told her judges that their purpose was 'to make me stink, and through me to make Chairman Mao stink, so as to revise the development of Marxism-Leninism and the immense contributions Chairman Mao made'.
The negation of the Cultural Revolution, and especially the trial of the sixteen, could not possibly avoid affecting Mao's status. In particular, one question inevitably bulked large: if sixteen leaders of the Cultural Revolution, including virtually all the luminaries of the period, were criminals, why was Mao still regarded as a great revolutionary leader? Was not he the biggest criminal of them all?
Deng Xiaoping repeatedly insisted that while Mao had made serious mistakes in his later years, his reputation should remain fundamentally intact. After all, as Deng told a foreign journalist in August 1980, 'for most of his life, Chairman Mao did very good things. Many times he saved the Party and the state from crises.’ But towards the end of his life he began to go wrong. He lost touch with reality and began to go 'counter to the style of work he himself had advocated'. However, because of his major earlier contributions, Mao could not be compared in any way with criminals like Jiang Qing. Naturally this line was echoed by the official press, but that did not ease concern among many ordinary people. The argument that Mao had made major contributions beforehand did not really absolve him for wrongdoings during the Cultural Revolution. If there was one point on which Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Qing could agree, it was that Mao was primarily responsible for the Cultural Revolution and it was he who was giving the orders at that time.
Nevertheless, Deng resisted sweeping downgrading of Mao because of the effects on legitimacy of the CCP and the regime. Deng himself made this point clear when, in June 1981, a few days before the Sixth Plenum was to convene, he told a preparatory meeting that 'certain recent remarks about some of Comrade Mao Zedong's mistakes' had gone too far. He asked that the excesses should be corrected 'so that, generally speaking, the assessment will conform to reality and enhance the image of the country and the Party as a whole’. His reference to China's and the CCP's image is very revealing: whether good or bad, Mao's role in the history of the CCP was just too towering to allow him to be fully discredited. The 'limits of criticism' of Mao were dictated by the need to preserve the authority of the CCP.
The Sixth Plenum did duly criticise the actions of Mao in his later years. It attacked not only the mistakes he had made during the Cultural Revolution, but also the fact that he had allowed or encouraged such a disaster to occur in the first place. It charged him with arrogance and other faults. At the same time, it reaffirmed that 'Comrade Mao Zedong was a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist and theorist', whose 'contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his mistakes' and whose 'merits are primary and his errors secondary’.
The aftermath of the Sixth Plenum
The Sixth Plenum was like a purging of the Chinese system. A definitive official assessment and rejection of the Cultural Revolution allowed attention to shift more fully to issues of reform. From that time, the Cultural Revolution did not dominate Chinese politics in the same way it had in the previous period.
Nevertheless, China was confronted with a problem of confidence, especially among young people. The Chinese people had been told, 'believe in radical revolution' and then soon afterwards told, 'radical revolution is nonsense and harmful; believe in reform'. Many were left feeling confused and deceived. The new reformed order encouraged them to get rich, and that is precisely what they did as far as they could. But the implication was that their order of priorities had changed. Whereas love of country and the people and loyalty to the Party had been primary, the top priority was now self and family, with the people and the country, let alone the Party, a long way down the list. The Party found itself faced with a 'crisis of faith’. Even more serious, the new attitudes and values produced by reform, together with the greater freedom, paved the way for growth in the extent of corruption.
When the Twelfth National Congress of the CCP met in 1982 it endorsed the conclusions of the Sixth Plenum and took several further reform measures, as well as confronting such problems as the crisis of faith and corruption. The two main changes in the Party system were abolition of the post of CCP Chairman and establishment of a new Central Advisory Commission. The first of these measures flowed directly from the criticism of the excessive power the single figure of Mao Zedong had been able to wield, especially during the Cultural Revolution. Hu Yaobang was appointed General Secretary of the CCP, which from this time on was the most senior formal position within the Party.
The Central Advisory Commission, composed of veteran Party leaders, was supposed to act as assistant and consultant to the Central Committee, and thus contribute to sharing power. However, the first person to be appointed to chair it was none other than Deng Xiaoping, who also remained Chairman of the Central Committee's Military Commission. The effect of the Twelfth Congress was actually to increase Deng's power, even though he showed no aspirations to the job of General Secretary.
In his report to the Congress, Hu Yaobang raised the issue of 'socialist spiritual civilisation', presented as a kind of recipe to counter the crisis of faith and the growing corruption. 'While working for a high level of material civilization,' he said, 'we must strive to build a high level of socialist spiritual civilization. This is a strategic principle for building socialism'. The two aspects of this socialist spiritual civilization were cultural and ideological, with each permeating the other. The people should accept a working-class world outlook, communist ideals, beliefs and moral values, including a collectivism corresponding to a system of socialist public ownership-in other words, precisely all the values which appeared to be deteriorating more quickly than ever under the impact of reform. Hu also echoed Deng Xiaoping's demand for a socialist democracy and an improvement in the CCP's system of democratic centralism. 'Undemocratic practices and patriarchal ways have still not been eradicated in many organizations,' he said. He attacked the corruption which he recognised as very destructive of inner-Party life, and which he saw as getting worse: while claiming that discipline inspection committees, the Party's organs charged with countering corruption, had made some progress, he also acknowledged that they had met 'considerable, and in some cases shocking, obstruction in their work'. Clearly the route towards 'socialist spiritual civilisation' would not be easy.
At the end of 1982, the National People's Congress adopted the PRC's fourth constitution, revising substantially the 1978 constitution. One revision which again showed rejection of the Cultural Revolution was that the post of President of the PRC, abolished by Mao, was now restored. It was ironical that only a few months after the Twelfth Party Congress had removed the Party chairmanship, a post to which Mao himself had lent such lustre for so long, the State Constitution should restore the post which he had acted to eliminate. In 1983, Li Xiannian was appointed (or, technically, elected by the National People's Congress) to fill the post.
Despite the rejection of the Cultural Revolution and the mainly successful implementation of reform, problems of corruption and 'crisis in faith' increasingly confronted the CCP leadership. In October 1983, the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee decided to undertake another ideological campaign, directed against 'spiritual pollution'. The campaign was a minor shift against an over-hasty pace of reform, but was not a rejection of reform itself. Although it was the closest thing to the Maoist style of campaign since the Third Plenum of 1978, it did not have an impact in any way similar to campaigns during Mao's time. Intellectuals and artists, among others, experienced some serious tension in the late months of 1983, with the banning of a few dramas and other works of art and fears of a renewed purge. By the beginning of 1984, however, the influence of the campaign had waned to the extent that many people were no longer taking it seriously and few were still worried about it.
The Second Plenum also decided to implement 'an overall rectification of Party style and a consolidation of Party organizations over a period of three years'. The main problem was seen as 'the corrosive influence of decadent bourgeois ideology and remnant feudal ideas’-that is, influence of ideas from abroad, especially the West, and thinking left over from the past, especially China's Confucian traditional attitudes. What was not to be criticised was the process of reform. Some people were expelled from the Party and the CCP did indeed go through a formal process of 'consolidation' over three years. However, the effects on the CCP were rather less than spectacular.
If the campaign against 'spiritual pollution' signified a minor trend towards slowing down the pace of reform, the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee, in October 1984, saw a swing back in the opposite direction. The decision of the Third Plenum focused mainly on the economy, concerning such matters as the price system. Issues such as management policy in urban units were also involved. Directors were given greater powers to hire and fire, disposing of the old idea that worker's in a socialist society could never be sacked. The idea of absolute egalitarianism was roundly condemned, simply because it prevented people from working hard and showing initiative. The widening gaps between rich and poor were of slighter concern than this disincentive. Just as reform really derived its origins from the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in 1978, the pace and extent of reform clearly took a very substantial step forward through the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee some six years later.
Conclusion
Change had been extraordinarily rapid in China between these two Third Plenums. Yet, the pace of different aspects of reform was uneven. Already economic modernization was beginning to outstrip its political partner. Although some aspects of society were becoming distinctly 'modern', there were others in which the trend appeared to be in precisely the opposite direction-towards the reinstatement of very ancient traditions. The reference which the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee made to the corrosive influence of feudal ideas must be taken seriously. The lifting of restraints had allowed back all kinds of traditional ideas and customs, including not only neutral or beautiful ones such as religious worship or traditional dramas and festivals, but also some less worthy, like superstitions, patriarchal domination of the young and of women, and ill-treatment of mothers failing to bear sons.
Many in the West noted the return of market mechanisms and free enterprise with enormous enthusiasm. Here was a communist party which seemed to be making genuine progress towards something which, if not really capitalism, was at least beginning to look like it. Although the situation changed greatly in the following period, it is doubtful that, as of 1984, many in the top Chinese leadership were seriously worried that the reforms could lead to capitalism. The leading role of the CCP had not yet been seriously challenged. The dominance of state ownership of industry was still perfectly secure. The reforms could genuinely be identified as consistent with 'socialism with Chinese characteristics', which represented at least one interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The new leadership could, and did, argue that it was not they, but the late Mao, who had departed from Marxism-Leninism.
The trouble was that the logic of reform implied the acceleration of change in a system which could not readily handle the shock. The policies of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee led directly on to those of the Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee. And the second of these two Third Plenums unleashed forces with very serious long-term implications, such as the gathering pace of inflation. The reforms increasingly took on their own momentum. Deng Xiaoping had accused Mao of arrogance and becoming divorced from reality. Perhaps he was himself suffering from the same weaknesses if he thought he could keep the situation on an even keel indefinitely.

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