数码天地 今日: 0|主题: 4759|排名: 41 

最后发表： coredump
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FROM:http://www.sciam.com.cn/html/nen ... 010/1202/14302.html





　　科学家最近发明了一款创可贴式MP3。这款MP3不需要夹在领子上或放在口袋里，只要贴在皮肤上就可以播放美妙的音乐，令人不禁 想起O+音乐活动(O+ Music Campaign)，在这种活动上，促销设备可在不同媒介上播放歌曲。

　　这款新潮的MP3看上去虽小，但五脏俱全，有播放/停止键以及弹性扬声器。它不需要电池，人体散发的热量就足以令其正常工作。缺憾是，这款MP3容量十分小，只能装下一个专辑的歌曲，而且音量不能按照人们的实际需要来调节。

　　虽然我们尚不能确定创可贴式MP3输出的音质如何，但这个概念本身就值得探讨。根据设计，在你锻炼的时候，或者不希望占用双手，但又想听音乐的场合，这款MP3就会派上用场。(杨孝文)

最后发表： yuba
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只要精神分裂开来就行

最后发表： 江南柴进
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多谢楼上指点。wordpress真不错。强烈推荐。

最后发表： 小名
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如果你指的是收澳洲的DVB-T数字电视。淘宝上是有卖的。你问好是DVB-T, 适合澳洲即可。

最后发表： x24
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http://news.cnblogs.com/n/83161/
　根据网络分析公司StatCounter透露，在11月份黑莓操作系统在美国移动互联网的使用份额首次超过苹果的IOS。 StatCounter表示他们的分析结果是在收集了每月超过150亿的页面浏览量样本（这些数据可能并不包括使用移动应用产生的流量）的基础上汇总得出的结果。

如图，上个月，黑莓操作系统有34.3％的流量份额，而苹果的IOS为33%。有趣的是，2009年11月，IOS在美国的流量份额为51.9％。在过去的一年，Android的流量份额从8.2％上升至23.8％。StatCounter推测，如果按目前的趋势不变，Android系统和黑莓操作系统在未来一年内的总流量份额会是IOS的两倍。

　　 在全球范围内，情况就大有不同了。Symbian以31.9％的流量份额占据领导地位，IOS以21.9％屈居老二，黑莓操作系统和Android操作系统则分别为19.3％和11.6％。

　　 市场研究公司Nielsen今天也发布了一些有趣的移动互联网统计数据。根据他们的数据，今年10月，美国战场中，IOS以27.9％市场份额操作系统战争中获得阶段性胜利，但跟黑莓操作系统相比只有0.5%的微弱优势。生机勃发的谷歌Android则在第三位，22.7％。

最后发表： EnsignKim
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http://cgi.ebay.com.au/ws/eBayIS ... eName=STRK:MEWNX:IT

最后发表： geza
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UMTS就是WCDMA。
是2100的网络，和联通的频段是一样的。

最后发表： coredump
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FROM：SOLIDOT
根据Netcraft和Wikileaks自己的报告，泄密网站Wikileaks受到的拒绝服务攻击（DDoS）规模正在升级，高峰时超过了每秒10 gigabits，迫使瑞典托管服务商让网站下线。在将服务器迁移到亚马逊具有弹性的云服务器之后，Wikileaks又重新上线。Wikileaks受到的攻击应该与它刚刚公布了25万份机密外交文件有关，背后或许是相关政府策划。

最后发表： mash
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考，找工作呢。。。
等找到了，就忙了。。。

羡慕你潇洒，开车走四方。。。我只能在梦里开。。。

最后发表： katsura
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http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2 ... -nuclear-ambitions/

By Ed Barnes

Published November 26, 2010
| FoxNews.com
  Print  Email  Share  Comments (817)  Text Size   

AP

In the 20th century, this would have been a job for James Bond.

The mission: Infiltrate the highly advanced, securely guarded enemy headquarters where scientists in the clutches of an evil master are secretly building a weapon that can destroy the world. Then render that weapon harmless and escape undetected.

But in the 21st century, Bond doesn't get the call. Instead, the job is handled by a suave and very sophisticated secret computer worm, a jumble of code called Stuxnet, which in the last year has not only crippled Iran's nuclear program but has caused a major rethinking of computer security around the globe.

Intelligence agencies, computer security companies and the nuclear industry have been trying to analyze the worm since it was discovered in June by a Belarus-based company that was doing business in Iran. And what they've all found, says Sean McGurk, the Homeland Security Department's acting director of national cyber security and communications integration, is a “game changer.”

The construction of the worm was so advanced, it was “like the arrival of an F-35 into a World War I battlefield,” says Ralph Langner, the computer expert who was the first to sound the alarm about Stuxnet. Others have called it the first “weaponized” computer virus.

Simply put, Stuxnet is an incredibly advanced, undetectable computer worm that took years to construct and was designed to jump from computer to computer until it found the specific, protected control system that it aimed to destroy: Iran’s nuclear enrichment program.

The target was seemingly impenetrable; for security reasons, it lay several stories underground and was not connected to the World Wide Web. And that meant Stuxnet had to act as sort of a computer cruise missile: As it made its passage through a set of unconnected computers, it had to grow and adapt to security measures and other changes until it reached one that could bring it into the nuclear facility.

When it ultimately found its target, it would have to secretly manipulate it until it was so compromised it ceased normal functions.

And finally, after the job was done, the worm would have to destroy itself without leaving a trace.

That is what we are learning happened at Iran's nuclear facilities -- both at Natanz, which houses the centrifuge arrays used for processing uranium into nuclear fuel, and, to a lesser extent, at Bushehr, Iran's nuclear power plant.

At Natanz, for almost 17 months, Stuxnet quietly worked its way into the system and targeted a specific component -- the frequency converters made by the German equipment manufacturer Siemens that regulated the speed of the spinning centrifuges used to create nuclear fuel. The worm then took control of the speed at which the centrifuges spun, making them turn so fast in a quick burst that they would be damaged but not destroyed. And at the same time, the worm masked that change in speed from being discovered at the centrifuges' control panel.

At Bushehr, meanwhile, a second secret set of codes, which Langner called “digital warheads,” targeted the Russian-built power plant's massive steam turbine.

Here's how it worked, according to experts who have examined the worm:

--The nuclear facility in Iran runs an “air gap” security system, meaning it has no connections to the Web, making it secure from outside penetration. Stuxnet was designed and sent into the area around Iran's Natanz nuclear power plant -- just how may never be known -- to infect a number of computers on the assumption that someone working in the plant would take work home on a flash drive, acquire the worm and then bring it back to the plant.

--Once the worm was inside the plant, the next step was to get the computer system there to trust it and allow it into the system. That was accomplished because the worm contained a “digital certificate” stolen from JMicron, a large company in an industrial park in Taiwan. (When the worm was later discovered it quickly replaced the original digital certificate with another certificate, also stolen from another company, Realtek, a few doors down in the same industrial park in Taiwan.)

--Once allowed entry, the worm contained four “Zero Day” elements in its first target, the Windows 7 operating system that controlled the overall operation of the plant. Zero Day elements are rare and extremely valuable vulnerabilities in a computer system that can be exploited only once. Two of the vulnerabilities were known, but the other two had never been discovered. Experts say no hacker would waste Zero Days in that manner.

--After penetrating the Windows 7 operating system, the code then targeted the “frequency converters” that ran the centrifuges. To do that it used specifications from the manufacturers of the converters. One was Vacon, a Finnish Company, and the other Fararo Paya, an Iranian company. What surprises experts at this step is that the Iranian company was so secret that not even the IAEA knew about it.

--The worm also knew that the complex control system that ran the centrifuges was built by Siemens, the German manufacturer, and -- remarkably -- how that system worked as well and how to mask its activities from it.

--Masking itself from the plant's security and other systems, the worm then ordered the centrifuges to rotate extremely fast, and then to slow down precipitously. This damaged the converter, the centrifuges and the bearings, and it corrupted the uranium in the tubes. It also left Iranian nuclear engineers wondering what was wrong, as computer checks showed no malfunctions in the operating system.

Estimates are that this went on for more than a year, leaving the Iranian program in chaos. And as it did, the worm grew and adapted throughout the system. As new worms entered the system, they would meet and adapt and become increasingly sophisticated.

During this time the worms reported back to two servers that had to be run by intelligence agencies, one in Denmark and one in Malaysia. The servers monitored the worms and were shut down once the worm had infiltrated Natanz. Efforts to find those servers since then have yielded no results.

This went on until June of last year, when a Belarusan company working on the Iranian power plant in Beshehr discovered it in one of its machines. It quickly put out a notice on a Web network monitored by computer security experts around the world. Ordinarily these experts would immediately begin tracing the worm and dissecting it, looking for clues about its origin and other details.

But that didn’t happen, because within minutes all the alert sites came under attack and were inoperative for 24 hours.

“I had to use e-mail to send notices but I couldn’t reach everyone. Whoever made the worm had a full day to eliminate all traces of the worm that might lead us them,” Eric Byres, a computer security expert who has examined the Stuxnet. “No hacker could have done that.”

Experts, including inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency, say that, despite Iran's claims to the contrary, the worm was successful in its goal: causing confusion among Iran’s nuclear engineers and disabling their nuclear program.

Because of the secrecy surrounding the Iranian program, no one can be certain of the full extent of the damage. But sources inside Iran and elsewhere say that the Iranian centrifuge program has been operating far below its capacity and that the uranium enrichment program had “stagnated” during the time the worm penetrated the underground facility. Only 4,000 of the 9,000 centrifuges Iran was known to have were put into use. Some suspect that is because of the critical need to replace ones that were damaged.

And the limited number of those in use dwindled to an estimated 3,700 as problems engulfed their operation. IAEA inspectors say the sabotage better explains the slowness of the program, which they had earlier attributed to poor equipment manufacturing and management problems. As Iranians struggled with the setbacks, they began searching for signs of sabotage. From inside Iran there have been unconfirmed reports that the head of the plant was fired shortly after the worm wended its way into the system and began creating technical problems, and that some scientists who were suspected of espionage disappeared or were executed. And counter intelligence agents began monitoring all communications between scientists at the site, creating a climate of fear and paranoia.

Iran has adamantly stated that its nuclear program has not been hit by the bug. But in doing so it has backhandedly confirmed that its nuclear facilities were compromised. When Hamid Alipour, head of the nation’s Information Technology Company, announced in September that 30,000 Iranian computers had been hit by the worm but the nuclear facilities were safe, he added that among those hit were the personal computers of the scientists at the nuclear facilities. Experts say that Natanz and Bushehr could not have escaped the worm if it was in their engineers’ computers.

“We brought it into our lab to study it and even with precautions it spread everywhere at incredible speed,” Byres said.

“The worm was designed not to destroy the plants but to make them ineffective. By changing the rotation speeds, the bearings quickly wear out and the equipment has to be replaced and repaired. The speed changes also impact the quality of the uranium processed in the centrifuges creating technical problems that make the plant ineffective,” he explained.

In other words the worm was designed to allow the Iranian program to continue but never succeed, and never to know why.

One additional impact that can be attributed to the worm, according to David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Studies, is that “the lives of the scientists working in the facility have become a living hell because of counter-intelligence agents brought into the plant” to battle the breach. Ironically, even after its discovery, the worm has succeeded in slowing down Iran's reputed effort to build an atomic weapon. And Langer says that the efforts by the Iranians to cleanse Stuxnet from their system “will probably take another year to complete,” and during that time the plant will not be able to function anywhere normally.

But as the extent of the worm’s capabilities is being understood, its genius and complexity has created another perplexing question: Who did it?

Speculation on the worm’s origin initially focused on hackers or even companies trying to disrupt competitors. But as engineers tore apart the virus they learned not only the depth of the code, its complex targeting mechanism, (despite infecting more than 100,000 computers it has only done damage at Natanz,) the enormous amount of work that went into it—Microsoft estimated that it consumed 10,000 man days of labor-- and about what the worm knew, the clues narrowed the number of players that have the capabilities to create it to a handful.

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Byers is more certain. “It is a military weapon,” he said.

And much of what the worm “knew” could only have come from a consortium of Western intelligence agencies, experts who have examined the code now believe.

Originally, all eyes turned toward Israel’s intelligence agencies. Engineers examining the worm found “clues” that hinted at Israel’s involvement. In one case they found the word “Myrtus” embedded in the code and argued that it was a reference to Esther, the biblical figure who saved the ancient Jewish state from the Persians. But computer experts say "Myrtus" is more likely a common reference to “My RTUS,” or remote terminal units.

Langer argues that no single Western intelligence agency had the skills to pull this off alone. The most likely answer, he says, is that a consortium of intelligence agencies worked together to build the cyber bomb. And he says the most likely confederates are the United States, because it has the technical skills to make the virus, Germany, because reverse-engineering Siemen’s product would have taken years without it, and Russia, because of its familiarity with both the Iranian nuclear plant and Siemen’s systems.

There is one clue that was left in the code that may tell us all we need to know.

Embedded in different section of the code is another common computer language reference, but this one is misspelled. Instead of saying “DEADFOOT,” a term stolen from pilots meaning a failed engine, this one reads “DEADFOO7.”

Yes, OO7 has returned -- as a computer worm.

Stuxnet. Shaken, not stirred.

最后发表： valpa
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本来就有sogou的云输入法可以用阿

最后发表： mianwo
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呵呵，不知到google earth有没有api，用这个开发游戏应该很有意思
超大无缝世界地图啊。。。

最后发表： coredump
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FROM:http://tech.163.com/10/1130/09/6MNQAVMH00094IR6.html


网易科技专栏作者 郭建龙

全球性网络渗透不仅让伊朗、朝鲜等政府头疼，也让美国政府头疼，最近美国政府、特别是外交部门，几乎被他们自己的网络推入了灾难的深渊。

为外交、国防花巨资建立的SIPRNet网络爆出大规模泄密事件，更倒霉的是，这些秘密被一个不知天高地厚的澳大利亚人阿桑奇（Julian Paul Assange）获得，并把他公布在一个叫做维基解密的网站上，以至于美国政府不管用请求、威胁，还是抓他小辫子告他性侵犯，都没能阻止这个继1971年五角大楼文件泄露和1972年水门事件后最大规模的泄密事件爆发。如果说那两次属于平媒时代的泄密典范，那么现在的这次可以称为网络时代的泄密典范。

在这里，关于澳大利亚人阿桑奇和他的维基解密网已经广为传播，但是，关于美国政府倒霉的SIPRNet网络却少为人知，这个花巨资建立、疏于管理又造成了重大事故的网络何去何从，到底技术上的加密手段能否保住秘密，都是我们应该追问的。另外，或许我们还可以从新闻和信息传播角度来看一看它背后的含义。

当然，这一切都要从一个普通情报分析员说起。

普通一卒搅乱江湖

2007年，20岁的情报分析员布莱德利曼宁（Bladley Manning）在伊拉克巴格达附近的美国部队工作。

在部队里，这位年轻人正在经历着理想幻灭的过程。他曾经对他的网友，一位记者兼前黑客的哈德良拉莫（Adrian Lamo）说起过一些令人气愤的事情。比如，他的上司分派给他任务，让他去调查一个“写文章阴谋反对伊拉克”的案件，但他调查的结果却是，这不过是有人写了篇学术化的文章，对伊拉克总理马利基政府中的腐败问题提出了批评，文章的名字叫《我们的钱去哪儿了？》，这样的文章如果放在美国，并不比克鲁格曼在《纽约时报》上的厥词更过分。他把自己的结论告诉了上级，结果上司叫他闭嘴，并告诉他总会找到更多的证据证明那个伊拉克人应该被抓起来。

另外，由于工作关系，他还能接触到不少机密（Secret级别）的东西，用他的话说就是每天14小时，每周七天，一连八个月。于是这个青年如同中了网瘾，整天泡在网络上查看着这些消息。从各国使馆的记录，到战争信息。

其中最令他震惊的是对伊拉克巴格达的一次空袭，以及另一次在阿富汗境内实施的空袭，两次事件都造成了平民的伤亡，内部网络的视频记录显示，空袭的美军有故意的嫌疑。

可以想见，一个对美国政权持怀疑态度的年轻人在观看如此众多的战争材料时是多么震惊。同时，那些外交资料又让他对于政治家之间的工作方式也多么不理解，政治本身就是表面上道貌岸然，背后一连串的讨价还价。也许对于政治家，做这些事情是理所应当的，但对于初次接触的人却是另一回事。

曼宁得出了结论：第一世界正在从第三世界攫取大量的利益，而他掌握的一切资料都可以构成证据。

事后，为了抹黑他，纽约时报的文章用结构主义的方法夹杂着弗洛伊德的理论，把他写得一看上去就是同性恋和政治狂想症患者。但在出事之前，曼宁却并不像捣乱的人，他喜欢听Lady Gaga的音乐，Lady Gaga就像中国的王菲加芙蓉姐姐的混合体，深受年轻人的喜爱，他的爱好反应出他只是个普通的年轻美国士兵。

但实际上，曼宁手里那些标着Lady Gaga的碟片却是空的，当人们看见他戴着耳机在电脑前摇头晃脑时，他却正在往盘里下载美国政府的机密文件。

这些文件被下载了下来，经过分类、压缩，最后通过民用网络传播出去，到了另一个被美国政府抹黑的人手中，这个人后来被描绘成强奸犯（和国内一样，每个坏人都会在性上出问题），他就是维基解密创始人阿桑奇。

曼宁偷盗出的资料包括那两段涉嫌屠杀无辜的空袭视频，还包括证明“第一世界压榨第三世界”的多达20多万份的美国外交电报材料。这些文件正在被维基解密网站逐渐释放出来，令人啼笑皆非的是，英国《卫报》、德国的《明镜周刊》，加上一家美国的报纸《纽约时报》正在配合着维基解密把美国的秘密释放出来。

曼宁后来被他的网友拉莫告发被捕，现在可能仍被关押在科威特等待着调查和可能的审讯。拉莫告发的动机和曼宁一样，也是出于正义感，他们都有正义感，但动作却正好相反。

在这里，我不打算多关注曼宁的命运，只想看一看被曼宁视若无物的那个网络：SIPRNet。

“秘密网络”还是“破网一张”

SIPRNet的全称是秘密互联协议路由网（Secret Internet Protocol Router Network），是美国国务院和国防部用来存储和传输秘密文件的网络。它的底层仍然使用IP协议，但上层使用了加密协议。

它和NIPRNet、JWICS属于美国国防部网络的三胞胎，分别用于传输不同密级的文件。

NIPRNet（非秘密互联协议路由网，Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network），用于在内部传输非秘密的，但是又有些敏感的信息。另两种网络从物理上是与外面的互联网分开的，但NIPRNet和外界互联网有相连的部分，为外界互联网访问提供门户支持。

SIPRNet传送的是机密（Secret）以下的秘密信息，而JWICS（联合万维情报交流系统，Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System）传送的则是绝密（Top Secret）信息。

它们的前身就是早期大名鼎鼎的军用网络Milnet（Military Network）。

人们经常在网络上看到，黑客通过互联网入侵美国国防部的消息，实际上，绝大部分攻击只是逞一时之快，所窃取到的秘密是十分有限的。这其中就有美国网络分层的功劳，由于只有NIPRNet是与国际互联网物理连接的，而NIPRNet的密级最低，即便真的被攻破了，能够引起轰动的消息，或者有价值的情报也不多，损失是可以控制的。

至于机密和绝密情报，分别跑在SIPRNet和JWICS上，由于物理隔绝，黑客们想要进攻也无从下手。物理隔绝是网络安全的最高层面，理论上，如果不能突破物理限制，黑客们几乎无法入侵。

正是由于这个原因，对于两个网路的安全性很有把握，国防部才敢于把它们大肆铺开。

但它真的安全吗？

2000年之后，SIPRNet更是大扩张，向外交领域渗透。当然，它的扩张又和911有关。

2001的911之后，美国情报部门痛定思痛的结论之一，就是情报部门的工作效率低下，各种情报严重割裂，无法对接，导致有用的情报被忽略掉了。

如果要解决这个问题，就必须利用网络的优点，把情报充分在内部进行分享。这就是所谓“情报要送到需要的人手中”。

由于外交也属于情报的一部分，也被纳入到网络之中。之前，某些驻外外交机构的电报也从SIPRNet走，但数量较少，此后由于SIPRNet的大规模铺设，越来越多的机构加入其中。

2002年，有125个大使馆接上了SIPRNet。2005年，180个。现在，有250多个外交机构（包括大使馆）上网。大使馆与美国之间的电报也走这个网络。为了便捷，不仅外交部门的人可以访问，就连军方人员也可以访问。当然，军方人员必须拥有相应的密级才可以，也就是拥有机密（Secret）以上级别的访问权。

那么拥有相应密级的人有多少？答案是：超过300万。这还是近20年前的数据，现在的数据随着便利政策的实行，应该还会更多。作为新兵蛋子、而且思想不稳定的曼宁都可以拥有访问权限，可见，其密级的授权已经处于失控状态了。

另外，911之后美国传递情报方面又走向了另一个极端，以前是情报割裂无法共享，现在由于过分强调“情报要送到需要的人手中”，忽视了安全性，使得原本制定的许多安全措施都停留在了理论上。

理论上，如果有人员登陆SIPRNet时，就必须全程在场，哪怕他要离开一会儿泡杯咖啡，都必须先退出网络。理论上，任何接入过SIPRNet的设备，比如CD盘等，都自动带上了同样的密级。理论上，不允许个人设备接入网络。但随着人们的懈怠，这些政策都无法得到有效的执行。

据称，由于驻伊美军的抗议，SIPRNet（至少在伊拉克部分）的一个预警系统也停掉了。为曼宁的窃密做好了准备。

在美国指导思想的变更下，在技术上和物理上几乎无懈可击的SIPRNet由于执行的懈怠，顿成破网一张。

在这里，人们仍然对于曼宁的角色心存疑问：所谓的窃密到底是不是这样一个年轻的一等兵所为？但这并不是关键，关键在于，即便不是他，也会是其他人，在庞大的300万人的队伍中，到底还有多少个曼宁在等待机会，或者已经把情报转移了！

一句玩笑：情报要送给需要的人，而最需要的是什么人？是它的对手和那些等待爆料的新闻记者。

泄密即监督

德国之声的记者Marc Koch认为，维基解密揭露美军对于平民的误伤误炸是合理行为，但其更进一步披露外交电报，就显得过分了。因为外交电报本来就属于内部讨论，自然会比较坦率，如果内部的话语和评价公布出来，就算是完全正确的，也会被断章取义在国际上引起纠纷。

那些被美国政治家们评头论足的全世界领导人听到自己的负面评价作何感想？他们是否还能信任美国人的保密措施？这些问题都在一个普通小卒的搅局下被提了出来。此时，再讨论曼宁是否偏执，阿桑奇是否虚荣都已经不重要，重要的是他们已经造成了深远的影响。

对于美国政府来说，如何堵上情报系统的漏洞也许是下一步应该考虑的问题，在强大的堡垒也是从内部攻破的，当面临着几百万的访问权时，投入再多的经费用于硬件加密也是无效的。

在这里无非是黑客学说中的社会工程学，即利用人来获得秘密，而不纯粹是网络技术行为。在经过了多年的渲染之后，人们发现所谓的网络泄密最终只不过是千百年间谍游戏的继续，而不是一个全新的开始。

当然，另一个问题是，如果过分强调保密，又会回到过去那种情报分割的状态，网络完全发挥不出优势来。于是，这里出现了一个悖论，要么便利但是容易泄密，要么安全但是笨拙。这个悖论有解吗？

答案或许在于透明性。现代政府往往找各种各样的借口（维稳、安全等等）把不该设为秘密的东西胡乱设为秘密，到后来，任何政府的违规行为都算成了秘密，也难怪人们乐于追根问底看政府的热闹。只有减少政府的透明度，减少秘密的数量，才能让秘密更加容易保管，也更能把政府置于人们的监督之下。

我不同意德国之声记者的看法，在我看来，只要没有透明性，那么即便是民主体制也无法保障人民的权益，更何况这个世界上充斥着各色各样的政权。如果美国人在关塔那摩虐囚，很难保证下一个遭受虐待的不是没罪的人。如果美国人允许胡乱轰炸平民，在以后的战争中只会助长越来越多的残暴行为。

两千年前，年轻的凯撒在为喀提林辩护的时候，曾经提到，雅典当初的三十僭主审判恶人的时候，为了便捷绕开了法律，并得到了人们的交口称赞，但之后雅典人笑不出来了，因为三十僭主们绕开法律开始对付普通的雅典人，使得整个雅典受到了伤害。

即便三十僭主被推翻后，这样的暴虐情绪却保留了下来，于是又有了新的受害者，其中包括苏格拉底。

对于所谓的外交函件的暴露，即便受到了更多的批评，但也是正当的。人们必须认识到在网络环境下，所谓的保密思路必须有所改变，当初想把什么设成秘密就把什么设成秘密的时代已经正在成为过去，现代人正在通过技术拥有更大的知情权。如果你认为自己的行为是正当的，那么就不要怕暴露，即便最初人们不理解，时间长了，也会习惯。

如果不顺应这股潮流，就只能陷入一次有一次的尴尬。从这个角度来说，泄密就是最好的解药，让人们能够行使更广泛的监督之权，不光对美国政府有效，对其他政府也许更加必要。

最后发表： wukong
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强，潜水手机，能抗几米水压？

最后发表： yuba
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你说的也是啊

要不咱也月经月经，让更多的人知道这个好东西。

最后发表： trisun
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不认为外挂有罪，和中介性质一样。

最后发表： 李大锤
回复内容：
没错，俺们已经这么用很长时间啦

最后发表： 李大锤
回复内容：
贴图贴图贴图

最后发表： laysman
回复内容：
我自从签了3的$29 cap，怎么几乎每个月都要超出预算呢？

最后发表： kamiyasama
回复内容：
是一张光盘读不出还是多数光盘都读不出？lz没有说明。

就一张读不出的话，应该是这张盘子挂了。你可以尝试一下用别人的光驱去读一下。能读出来是最好了。

n张都读不出的话，应该是你的光驱时间长了读盘能力下降了，也有可能是那些盘子保存不当or质量不好全都挂了。解决办法是也用别人的光驱读一下看看。

以上的读不出是指碟放进cd/dvdrom后，光驱不断读盘，我的电脑里看不到盘片容量，或者看到了但是无法进到根目录查看任何文件。

最后发表： 0065
回复内容：
我用PA

最后发表： 0065
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我来打酱油的

最后发表： sliuhao
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you already have this DNS, if you use tpg...

最后发表： coredump
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其实1个也就够了，然后大家都去背诵电报码

最后发表： GPS
回复内容：
用google 去干合法的事，通常很简单。去干非法的事，通常很绕弯。

最后发表： 李大锤
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红外线在光纤上传输？

最后发表： bill.zheng
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仅仅谈语言而谈语言，有意义么？ 选择合适的语言应用于合适的项目才是合理的吧？

最后发表： yuba
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i5是必须的，硬盘最好是7200的

最后发表： stoval
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各位同学，想必大家的手机都有相机吧。有没有想过让它在将来的某个时间段，以固定的间隔来拍摄照片那.
我基于Nokia的Symbian 平台开发拉一个小程序:CamLite.刚刚发不到Nokia的OVI Store: http://store.ovi.com/content/58710

最后发表： yearshappy
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关于标准答案问题

我们做学生的１０多年都在追求　‘标准答案’而且是唯一的标追答案－　这个‘标准答案　’的标准之一就是要有所谓的深度和共同性的概括等，不能“俗”，　不能‘简单’。　参加工作后，一级一级地遵从上级。结果是多数的我们都是相对比较少地个人独立思考，有标准答案就不再想了，有上级就结了。　　
。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。

最后发表： key
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神马架构师，它只是浮云，只是浮云。。。。

最后发表： joen
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听说Spring比EJB3功能还要多一些。Spring即轻巧又强大，那么EJB3还有市场吗？

最后发表： Richard.G
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现在估计是35.7Billion. 比原先预想的少花费7个billion.

http://news.ninemsn.com.au/natio ... -less-than-expected

http://www.arnnet.com.au/article ... billion_43_billion/

[ 本帖最后由 Richard.G 于 26-11-2010 21:41 编辑 ]

最后发表： coredump
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说明还得知道存在着恶意但是很有权力的网络蜘蛛。

最后发表： mianwo
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其实android也有，不过我没研究过，不做评价。。。

最后发表： coredump
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OCR， 据说Google Docs支持PDF OCR,没试过。

最后发表： conty
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IxExplorer和IxNetwork
共享个给我吧
多谢多谢

最后发表： mason00
回复内容：
唉。。。Google Wave当初被当作神作一样期待，现在居然停了

最后发表： niuzefeng
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呵呵，建议楼主新开个投票，看看大家常有的代码控制系统都用那些，俺会坚定投CVS一票的。

最后发表： coredump
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Oracle是个商业怪兽